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I. Introduction 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause has 
shifted many times throughout American history.1 At times the power has 
been limited in nature, and at other times very expansive.2 In the last twenty 
years the expansive nature of the Commerce Clause power has come under 
scrutiny.3 The future of Commerce Clause jurisprudence is still somewhat 
questionable, due to the fact that the Court has carved out various nuances 
to what the power covers.4 
These decisions have led to constitutional challenges of several 
legislative regimes.5 These challenges include the challenge of the Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act as being outside of the scope of 
Commerce Clause power.6 The recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence, in 
combination with the upholding of the Affordable Care Act on Tax and 
Spend grounds rather than Commerce Clause grounds, further leads to 
questions regarding the future of Commerce Clause power.7  
                                                                                                     
 1. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 242 (3d 
ed. 2006) (“Over the course of American history, the Supreme Court has adopted varying 
views as to the meaning of the commerce clause and the extent to which congressional 
powers under it are limited by the Tenth Amendment.”). 
 2. See id. at 243 (outlining the various phases of Commerce Clause jurisprudence). 
 3. See id. at 264 (discussing the more recent narrowing of the scope of Commerce 
Clause power). 
 4. See id. (discussing the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of certain statutes to 
maintain their constitutionality). 
 5. See id. at 264–70 (discussing the attack on the Violence Against Women Act in 
United States v. Morrison and the opposition to the Water Pollution Control Act in Solid 
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers as two 
examples of Commerce Clause arguments after Lopez). 
 6. Infra Part II.F. 
 7. See David A. Strauss, Commerce Clause Revisionism and the Affordable Care Act, 
2012 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3 (2013)  
A central issue in the litigation was whether the Commerce Clause authorized 
Congress to enact the so-called individual mandate—a provision of the ACA 
requiring that individuals have health insurance. A majority of the Court, by a 
vote of 5–4, concluded that the mandate exceeded Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause, although a different 5–4 majority sustained the mandate as 
an exercise of Congress’s power to tax under the General Welfare Clause. 
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This Note argues that the federal registration requirement incorporated 
into the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, given the recent 
course of interpretive limitations, in combination with the Affordable Care 
Act decision, falls outside of the scope of the Commerce Clause.8 The first 
part of this Note explores the legislative history of the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act, the constitutional challenges that resulted 
therefrom, and the history of the Commerce Clause that brings into question 
the constitutionality of the registration requirements.9 Part II discusses 
United States v. Kebodeaux and NFIB v. Sebelius and why these recent 
decisions bring the constitutionality of the federal registration requirement 
into question and reveal a new perspective to many Circuit Court decisions 
regarding SORNA.10 Part III discusses the consequences of this federal 
overstep and the infringement on states’ rights as well as individual 
liberties.11 
II. SORNA: History, Construction, and Constitutional Questions 
A. Legislative History 
The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)12 has 
been controversial from a constitutional perspective since its passage in 
2006.13 SORNA was enacted as a part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection 
and Safety Act of 2006.14 This law replaced the Jacob Wetterling Crimes 
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act of 1994 
(Wetterling Act).15 The Wetterling Act provided that the U.S. Attorney 
General would promulgate guidelines for states to follow when 
                                                                                                     
 8. Infra Part III. 
 9. Infra Parts II.A–E. 
 10. Infra Part III. 
 11. Infra Part IV. 
 12. Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911–16929 
(2012). 
 13. See Rebecca L. Visgaitis, Retroactive Application of the Sex Offender Registration 
and Notification Act: A Modern Encroachment on Judicial Power, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 273, 282 (2011) (positing that the registration aspect of SORNA was immediately 
controversial and resulted in many challenged convictions). 
 14. United States v. Powers, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1331 (2008). 
 15. Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender 
Registration Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (repealed). 
210 22 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 207 (2016) 
implementing state-run registration systems for convicted sex offenders.16 
In 1996, the addition of Megan’s Law to this Act made federal funding for 
state law enforcement dependent on the creation of state databases for the 
registration of sex offenders.17 The federal funding for these registration 
programs was not dependent on states requiring past offenders to register 
within the new system retroactively.18 By the year 2000, every state and the 
District of Columbia had functional sex offender registrations.19  
SORNA replaced a patchwork of state registration systems and 
guidelines and required convicted sex offenders to register according to 
uniform federal guidelines.20 SORNA did not expand on the registration 
requirements for past offenders, but instead directed the Attorney General 
to promulgate registration requirements.21 Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzalez issued a regulation on February 28, 2007, which explicitly 
applied SORNA’s registration requirements to those who were convicted 
prior to the passage of SORNA.22 The failure to register according to the 
federal registration requirements resulted for the first time in a federal 
criminal penalty.23  
                                                                                                     
 16. Id. 
 17. See Powers, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 1331 (“In 1996 the Wetterling Act was amended 
by Megan’s Law, which made the receipt of federal funding for state law enforcement 
dependent upon the creation of sex offender registration programs. Every state had enacted 
some variation of Megan’s Law by 1997.” (citation omitted)). 
 18. See Final Guidelines for Megan’s Law and the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against 
Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 62 Fed. Reg. 39,009, 39,013 (July 
21, 1997) (“The Act does not require states to attempt to identify and impose registration 
requirements on offenders who were convicted of offenses in these categories prior to the 
establishment of a conforming registration system.”). 
 19. See United States v. Begay, 622 F.3d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 2010) (“As a result of 
the Wetterling Act, by 2000, all fifty states and the District of Columbia had both sex 
offender registration systems and community notification programs.”). 
 20. See National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 38,030, 38,045 (July 2, 2008) (“Ultimately, Congress concluded that the patchwork of 
standards that had resulted from piecemeal amendments should be replaced with a 
comprehensive new set of standards . . . that would close potential gaps and loopholes under 
the old law, and generally strengthen the nationwide network of sex offender registration and 
notification programs.”). 
 21. See Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. § 16912(b) (2012) 
(“The Attorney General shall issue guidelines and regulations to interpret and implement this 
subchapter.”). 
 22. See 28 C.F.R. § 72.3 (2011) (“The requirements of the Sex Offender Registration 
and Notification Act apply to all sex offenders, including sex offenders convicted of the 
offense for which registration is required prior to the enactment of that Act.”). 
 23. See Visgaitis, supra note 13, at 274 (“SORNA also created a new federal crime of 
failing to register pursuant to a state’s requirements, punishable by up to ten years in 
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B. Section 16913 
Section 16913 of SORNA provides: 
(a) In general: A sex offender shall register, and keep the registration 
current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, where the offender 
is an employee, and where the offender is a student. For initial registration 
purposes only, a sex offender shall also register in the jurisdiction in 
which convicted if such jurisdiction is different from the jurisdiction of 
residence.  
(b) Initial registration: The sex offender shall initially register— 
(1) before completing a sentence of imprisonment with respect to the 
offense giving rise to the registration requirement; or  
(2) not later than 3 business days after being sentenced for that offense, if 
the sex offender is not sentenced to a term of imprisonment.  
(c) Keeping the registration current: A sex offender shall, not later than 3 
business days after each change of name, residence, employment, or 
student status, appear in person in at least 1 jurisdiction involved pursuant 
to subsection (a) of this section and inform that jurisdiction of all changes 
in the information required for that offender in the sex offender registry. 
That jurisdiction shall immediately provide that information to all other 
jurisdictions in which the offender is required to register.24 
This section sets forth the registration requirements.25 It is important to note 
that § 16913 contains no interstate jurisdictional component to the 
registration requirement.26 This section defines who qualifies as a sex 
offender, and also sets forth the three-day time constraint on registration.27 
This section is also separated from the component of SORNA that contains 
the punishment for failure to register, § 2250. 
C. Section 2250 
Section 2250 of SORNA provides that whoever  
(1) is required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act;  
                                                                                                     
prison.”). 
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 16913 (2012).  
 25. Id. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id.  
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(2)(A) is a sex offender as defined for the purposes of the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act by reason of a conviction under Federal 
law (including the Uniform Code of Military Justice), the law of the 
District of Columbia, Indian tribal law, or the law of any territory or 
possession of the United States; or  
(B) travels in interstate or foreign commerce, or enters or leaves, or 
resides in, Indian country; and  
(3) knowingly fails to register or update a registration as required by the 
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act; shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.28 
Section 2250 is the part of the Act that provides for the criminal 
prosecution of those who fail to register in accordance with § 16913.29 This 
provision requires the definitions and requirements as set forth in 
§ 16913.30 In Carr v. United States,31 the Supreme Court explained, 
“Section 2250 is not a stand-alone response to the problem of missing sex 
offenders; it is imbedded in a broader statutory scheme enacted to address 
the deficiencies in prior law that had enabled sex offenders to slip through 
the cracks.”32 In that same case the Court also considered that § 2250 and 
§ 16913 were enacted with different policies in mind.33 The Court noted 
that knowing the purpose behind the enactment of § 16913 “tells us little 
about the specific policy choice Congress made in enacting § 2250.”34 The 
question remains as to whether the provisions in § 2250 properly regulate 
the registration requirements of § 16913.35 
                                                                                                     
 28. 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2012).  
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.  
 31. 560 U.S. 438 (2010). 
 32. Id. at 455 (citations omitted).  
 33. See id. at 456 (discussing that knowing SORNA’s purpose does not inform one of 
the policy choices made regarding enforcement of the Act). 
 34. Id.  
 35. Cf. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012) 
The Government says that health insurance and health care financing are 
“inherently integrated.” But that does not mean the compelled purchase of the 
first is properly regarded as a regulation of the second. No matter how 
“inherently integrated” health insurance and health care consumption may be, 
they are not the same thing: They involve different transactions, entered into at 
different times, with different providers. And for most of those targeted by the 
mandate, significant health care needs will be years, or even decades, away. The 
proximity and degree of connection between the mandate and the subsequent 
commercial activity is too lacking to justify an exception of the sort urged by the 
Government.  
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D. Nondelegation Doctrine Challenges 
These regulations resulted in numerous challenges under the 
nondelegation doctrine, but the law was unanimously upheld.36 Many 
defendants argued that the statute’s delegation of the authority to 
promulgate these registration requirements to the Attorney General was not 
done with an intelligible principle that the Attorney General had to follow.37 
Circuit courts that have addressed this issue have unanimously held that the 
statute’s delegation of authority to decide whether SORNA registration 
requirements applied retroactively was within Congress’s discretion, and 
that the Act laid out a sufficiently intelligible principle.38 These decisions 
could reflect the judicial branch’s deference to the legislature on issues of 
delegation of power.39 It is unclear, however, whether the Supreme Court 
would hold unanimously that SORNA would withstand a nondelegation 
challenge.40 All of these cases were denied certiorari.41  
                                                                                                     
(citation omitted). 
 36. See generally United States v. Parks, 698 F.3d 1, 7–8 (1st Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Guzman, 591 F.3d 83, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Cooper, 750 F.3d 
263, 264 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. Rogers, 468 F. App’x 359, 362 (4th Cir. 2012); 
United States v. Whaley, 577 F.3d 254, 263–64 (5th Cir. 2009); Unites States v. Felts, 674 
F.3d 599, 606 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Goodwin, 717 F.3d 511, 516–17 (7th Cir. 
2013); United States v. Kuehl, 706 F.3d 917, 919–20 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. 
Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1213–14 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 37. See Parks, 698 F.3d at 7 (“Parks next claims that the Attorney General’s statutory 
authority to apply the registration requirements to those convicted of sexual offenses before 
SORNA’s enactment contravenes constitutional limitations on the delegation of legislative 
power.”). 
 38. See id. (reasoning that the Attorney General’s assessment on this question made 
perfect sense because of the practical effects this law would have on that office). 
 39. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“Applying this 
‘intelligible principle’ test to congressional delegations, our jurisprudence has been driven 
by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever 
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability 
to delegate power under broad general directives.”). 
 40. See Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975, 986 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Indeed, it is not entirely clear to me that Congress can constitutionally leave it to the 
Attorney General to decide—with no statutory standard whatever governing his discretion—
whether a criminal statute will or will not apply to certain individuals. That seems to me 
sailing close to the wind with regard to the principle that legislative powers are 
nondelegable.”).  
 41. Supra note 36. 
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E. Ex Post Facto Challenges 
The February 28, 2007 regulation was also challenged on ex post facto 
grounds as extending punishment to those who were found guilty prior to 
the passage of SORNA.42 The Constitution in Article I section 10 provides, 
“No state shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto law.”43 Challengers argued 
that being punished for failing to register for crimes committed before the 
passage of SORNA in 2006 violated their rights under this clause.44 Circuit 
courts upheld SORNA in the face of these challenges as well,45 insisting 
that the registration requirements imposed by SORNA were not meant to be 
punitive, but rather were civil penalties for the benefit of informing the 
public of safety concerns.46 The statute punished individuals not for their 
past sex offenses, but for their current failure to register.47 
F. Commerce Clause Challenges 
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power “[t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States.”48 The heart 
of this challenge to the registration requirement in SORNA is that it 
requires action to be taken even if the crime is purely local.49 This argument 
stems from the three distinct categories of Congress’s regulatory authority 
under the Commerce Clause: regulation of channels, regulation of 
instrumentalities, and regulation of activities that have a substantial effect 
                                                                                                     
 42. See United States v. Shoulder, 738 F.3d 948, 954 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]oday 
SORNA’s registration requirement imposes significant hardships on offenders, who are 
‘held to public ridicule by community members,’ and face difficulty finding and maintaining 
both employment and housing.” (citation omitted)). 
 43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 44. See United States v. Zuniga, 579 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2009) (stating that Zuniga 
argued that because SORNA punishes him for behavior that occurred before SORNA was 
enacted, SORNA violates the ex post facto clause). 
 45. See generally Shoulder, 738 F.3d at 954. 
 46. Id.  
 47. See Zuniga, 579 F.3d at 850 (“[T]he statute does not punish an individual for 
previously being convicted of a sex offense, but it instead merely ‘punishes an individual for 
traveling in interstate commerce and failing to register.’” (quotation omitted)). 
 48. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3. 
 49. See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 471 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating that the 
argument made against SORNA on Commerce Clause grounds was that regulating 
registration for purely local offenses does not have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce). 
NFIB v. Sebelius: A Feather in the Cap 215 
on interstate commerce.50 The Commerce Clause challenges have also 
failed to overturn the registration requirements of SORNA in most 
instances.51 These courts determine that the registration of sex offenders 
falls within Congress’s jurisdiction with regard to channels and 
instrumentalities of commerce.52  
There remains, however, some question as to whether Congress 
overstepped its Commerce Clause authority in enacting the criminal penalty 
in SORNA.53 In United States v. Powers,54 the court determined that the 
issue of sex offender registration fell outside of the realm of the 
instrumentalities or channels of interstate commerce.55 The court 
determined that this issue must then fall within the third category—
substantial relationship to interstate commerce.56 The court in Powers 
determined that there was not a substantial relationship to interstate 
commerce, and that the law’s mere mention of interstate travel did not 
amount to a sufficient nexus to commerce to give Congress authority to 
enact this legislation.57 This case was vacated and remanded at the appellate 
                                                                                                     
 50. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (recapping Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence and the three instances when it can be regulated). 
 51. See Gould, 568 F.3d at 471–72 (holding that the registration requirement does not 
violate the Commerce Clause). 
 52. See id. (noting that the conclusion that SORNA registration requirements falls 
within the first two Lopez categories is consistent with the reasoning of other circuit courts 
that have found SORNA to be legitimate under the channels and instrumentalities analysis). 
 53. See Corey Rayburn Yung, One of These Laws is not Like the Others: Why the 
Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act Raises New Constitutional 
Questions, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 407–08 (2010) (“Whereas states have virtually 
unlimited power to create crimes related to sex offender registration, there is a substantial 
question as to whether SORNA is a constitutional use of federal power.”). 
 54. 544 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1331–36 (M.D. Fla. 2008), vacated, 584 F.3d 1349 (11th 
Cir. 2009).  
 55. See id. at 1333–34 (“Here we are clearly not dealing with the regulation of 
channels or instrumentalities of commerce. Nor are we dealing with the regulation of 
persons or things in interstate commerce.”). 
 56. See id. at 1334  
Indeed, the statute in question here makes no effort to regulate the interstate 
movement of persons who are sex offenders. Those persons are permitted to 
travel freely throughout the country without consequence, so long as they 
remain registered in the state in which they reside, work and/or go to school. 
Thus, to withstand scrutiny under the Commerce Clause, this statute must 
regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. 
 57. See id. at 1335 (“Like the statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison, SORNA has 
nothing to do with commerce or any form of economic enterprise. Activities held to affect 
interstate commerce have been uniformly economic in character, or had some effect on the 
national market.”). 
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level, but it still provided a compelling argument against the 
constitutionality of SORNA.58 The Commerce Clause issue was denied 
certiorari on March 1, 2010.59 
G. History of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence 
The history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence can be broken into 
three broad eras.60 In the first era, the Lochner era, the Court took a 
formalist approach to Commerce Clause jurisprudence.61 During this time, 
the Commerce Clause was dealt with in the literal sense, and it was not 
clear whether even activities like mining62 or regulation of labor63 would be 
included in the nation’s understanding of Congress’s power to regulate 
commerce because they were not interstate and not commerce in the 
traditional sense.64 In the Lochner era, there was an emphasis on the 
economic rights of individuals, and governmental regulation of working 
conditions or hours infringed on these individual economic rights.65 This 
approach to the Commerce Clause power led to the Court striking down 
large swaths of federal legislation, such as aspects of the New Deal.66 
Next came the expansive era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.67 
During this era the powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause were 
                                                                                                     
 58. See id. at 1344 (vacating the order of the district court and remanding). 
 59. See Gould v. United States, 559 U.S. 974, 974 (2010) (denying certiorari). 
 60. See Alison L. LaCroix, The Shadow Powers of Article I, 123 YALE L.J. 2044, 
2045–50 (2014) (describing the changes throughout the country’s history in the 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause and federalism generally). 
 61. See id. at 2047 (noting that the 1918 invalidation of the Child Labor Act relied 
heavily on the Tenth Amendment and the fear of encroaching on the states’ police power). 
 62. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 869 (1936) (“We have seen that the 
word ‘commerce’ is the equivalent of the phrase ‘intercourse for the purposes of trade.’ 
Plainly, the incidents leading up to and culminating in the mining of coal do not constitute 
such intercourse.”). 
 63. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (holding that the New York 
statute preventing bakers from working over sixty hours a week interfered with an 
individual’s right to contract).  
 64. See LaCroix, supra note 60, at 2046–47 (describing the invalidation of the Child 
Labor Act and the Court’s defensive stance towards state police power). 
 65. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 247 (discussing the aggressive use of judicial 
authority to invalidate federal statutes to ensure individual economic freedom). 
 66. Id.  
 67. See LaCroix, supra note 60, at 2047 (“After 1937, as is well known, the Court 
adopted an increasingly deferential stance toward congressional regulation under the 
commerce power.”). 
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greatly expanded.68 The Commerce Clause in combination with the 
Necessary and Proper Clause gave rise to the government being able to 
regulate manufacturing,69 labor,70 and even purely local and non-
commercial activity that in the aggregate would affect interstate 
commerce.71 The Court deemphasized the economic liberties of the 
Lochner era, and the new scheme of authority under the Commerce Clause 
encompassed these activities previously though, to be outside of Congress’s 
reach.72 The Commerce Clause was not used to strike down legislation, but 
rather as a catalyst enabling the federal government to enact sweeping 
reforms like New Deal legislation and the Civil Rights Act.73  
The Rehnquist Court later revived restrictions on Commerce Clause 
legislation in what is called the new federalism era.74 This Court reverted 
                                                                                                     
 68. See Craig L. Jackson, The Limiting Principle Strategy and Challenges to the New 
Deal Commerce Clause, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 11, 16 (2012) 
The new understanding of the Clause and the implementing authority provided 
by the substantial effects doctrine effectively dismissed dual federalism—the 
view that state and federal power regimes are completely separate and distinct—
allowing Congress to regulate intrastate activities as appropriate to the 
circumstances. The limiting principle was Congress’s own rationality 
assessment of its legislation. The new application of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause allowed the expansion of federal power into areas previously thought 
reserved for the states. 
 69. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 105 (1941) (holding that Congress could 
legislate for labor standards even if the labor was solely for the production or manufacturing 
of lumber that would subsequently enter into interstate commerce). 
 70. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (holding that 
minimum wage laws protecting women are a legitimate exercise of legislative power and 
showing deference to congressional reasoning for promulgating these laws). 
 71. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127 (1942) (holding that Congress can 
regulate growth of wheat for purely personal use because of the effect that personal 
consumption could have on the market as a whole). 
 72. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 256–57 (describing the shift in the Court’s 
thinking regarding the scope of Commerce Clause power). 
 73. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States 379 U.S. 241, 357–358 (1964) 
In framing Title II of this Act Congress was also dealing with what it considered 
a moral problem. But that fact does not detract from the overwhelming evidence 
of the disruptive effect that racial discrimination has had on commercial 
intercourse. It was this burden which empowered Congress to enact appropriate 
legislation, and, given this basis for the exercise of its power, Congress was not 
restricted by the fact that the particular obstruction to interstate commerce with 
which it was dealing was also deemed a moral and social wrong. 
 74. See LaCroix, supra note 60, at 2049 (noting that the debate over federalism has 
continued regarding the Commerce Clause but has shifted to bring in a more rigorous debate 
about the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause and to a lesser extent the General 
Welfare Clause).  
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back to a more conservative reading of the Commerce Clause and 
emphasized that the police powers are reserved for the states.75 Cases 
during Chief Justice Rehnquist’s tenure overturned laws criminalizing very 
specific actions, such as possession, that were purely local and in no way 
related to interstate commerce through a jurisdictional nexus.76  
In the new federalism era the Court specifically addressed criminal 
statutes that were not substantially related to interstate commerce.77 In the 
first of these cases, United States v. Lopez,78 the Court reviewed the Gun 
Free School Zones Act of 1990, which criminalized the possession of a 
firearm in a school zone.79 The Court concluded that “the proper test 
requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity ‘substantially affects’ 
interstate commerce.”80 Under this test, the mere possession of a firearm 
within a school zone did not meet the standard of substantially affecting 
interstate commerce.81 The language of the statute was too broad to limit 
the application to cases where it could be proven that the gun traveled 
through interstate commerce and the Act failed to withstand the Commerce 
Clause challenge.82 In considering the consequences of the decision in 
Lopez, the Court reasoned, 
Admittedly, a determination whether an intrastate activity is commercial 
or noncommercial may in some cases result in legal uncertainty. But, so 
long as Congress’ authority is limited to those powers enumerated in the 
Constitution, and so long as those enumerated powers are interpreted as 
having judicially enforceable outer limits, congressional legislation 
under the Commerce Clause always will engender “legal uncertainty.”83 
                                                                                                     
 75. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (invalidating a law prohibiting the 
possession of a firearm within a school zone). The Court also noted that “[t]o uphold the 
Government’s contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner 
that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a 
general police power of the sort retained by the States.” Id. 
 76. Id.  
 77. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 265–69 (discussing the Court’s decisions in 
Lopez and Morrison, both criminal statutes). 
 78. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549–602 (1995). 
 79. See id. at 551 (describing the Gun-Free School Zones Act).  
 80. Id. at 559. 
 81. See id. at 561 (“Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to 
do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define 
those terms.”). 
 82. See id. at 562 (“Unlike the statute in Bass, § 922(q) has no express jurisdictional 
element which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally 
have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.”). 
 83. Id. at 566.  
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This was the first time in almost sixty years that the Court declared a 
federal law unconstitutional as exceeding the scope of the Commerce 
Clause power.84 
The Court then added to new federalism in its holding in United States 
v. Morrison.85 The question before the Court was whether the civil damages 
provision of the Violence Against Women Act was constitutional.86 The 
statute at issue in Morrison differed from the statute in Lopez because the 
Violence Against Women Act included significant congressional findings 
regarding the overall economic impact that violence against women has on 
society.87 Despite these findings, the Court still found that there was not a 
sufficient connection to interstate commerce to warrant Commerce Clause 
authority.88 The Court “reject[ed] the argument that Congress may regulate 
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s 
aggregated effect on interstate commerce. The Constitution requires a 
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.”89 This 
holding narrowed Lopez by limiting what Congress could regulate even 
when it provides findings that show a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce if it is noneconomic in nature.90 In response to congressional 
findings that violence against women does have a substantial impact on 
commerce and therefore could be regulated by Congress, the Court writes, 
                                                                                                     
 84. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 264 (“Between 1936 and April 26, 1995, the 
Supreme Court did not find one federal law unconstitutional as exceeding the scope of 
Congress’s commerce power.”). 
 85. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 598–627 (2000); see also CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 1, at 267 (asserting that in Morrison, the Court upheld the three part test from 
Lopez). 
 86. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601 (describing the factual background and presenting 
the issue of the constitutionality of civil remedies for violence against women).  
 87. See id. at 614 (“In contrast with the lack of congressional findings that we faced in 
Lopez, § 13981 is supported by numerous findings regarding the serious impact that gender-
motivated violence has on victims and their families.” (emphasis added)). 
 88. See id. at 615 (“The reasoning . . . seeks to follow the but-for causal chain from the 
initial occurrence of violent crime (the suppression of which has always been the prime 
object of the States’ police power) to every attenuated effect upon interstate commerce.”); 
id. (“[A]llow[ing] Congress to regulate any crime [if the] . . . aggregated impact . . . has 
substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption . . . [encapsulating] 
gender-motivated violence. . . [because it has] lesser economic impacts than the larger class 
of which it is a part.”).  
 89. Id. at 617–18. 
 90. See id. at 616 (“Under our written Constitution, however, the limitation of 
congressional authority is not solely a matter of legislative grace.”). 
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The reasoning that petitioners advance seeks to follow the but-for causal 
chain from the initial occurrence of violent crime (the suppression of 
which has always been the prime object of the States’ police power) to 
every attenuated effect upon interstate commerce. If accepted, 
petitioners’ reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any crime as 
long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial 
effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption. Indeed, if 
Congress may regulate gender-motivated violence, it would be able to 
regulate murder or any other type of violence since gender-motivated 
violence, as a subset of all violent crime, is certain to have lesser 
economic impacts than the larger class of which it is a part.91 
More recently, the Court in Gonzalez v. Raich92 called into question 
just how much staying power this more stringent Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence had.93 The Court carved out an exception for regulating 
goods that never enter interstate commerce when the regulation is part of a 
scheme that clearly meets the jurisdictional nexus to interstate commerce.94 
This left open the issue of whether this revival of Commerce Clause 
invalidations would continue or whether they were simply a blip on the 
screen of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.95 This question seemed to be 
answered, at least in part, by the Court’s reliance on the Tax and Spend 
Clause—rather than the Commerce Clause—to validate the Affordable 
Care Act.96 It appears that the narrower reading of the Commerce Clause 
under the Rehnquist era has not been completely abandoned.97 
                                                                                                     
 91. Id. at 615.  
 92. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 1–33 (2005). 
 93. See id. at 57 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“By holding that Congress may regulate 
activity that is neither interstate nor commerce under the Interstate Commerce Clause, the 
Court abandons any attempt to enforce the Constitution’s limits on federal power.”). 
 94. See id. at 22 (majority opinion) (“Congress was acting well within its authority to 
‘make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper’ to ‘regulate Commerce . . . among the 
several States.’” (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8)); id. (“That the regulation ensnares some 
purely intrastate activity is of no moment. . . . [W]e refuse to excise individual components 
of that larger scheme.”).  
 95. See LaCroix, supra note 60, at 2049–50 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s ‘federalism 
revolution’ has . . . shifted from its . . . inquiry into the scope of Congress’s power to 
regulate interstate commerce, refracted through the Tenth Amendment, to become an inquiry 
into the transsubstantive reasons for allowing Congress to regulate at all.”); id. (“This 
transformation has been especially significant when the Court views Congress as venturing 
into a domain not explicitly specified in the text of Article I.”). 
 96. Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012); see also NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. 
Ct. 2566, 2587 (2012) (“The individual mandate, however, does not regulate existing 
commercial activity[,] . . . compel[ling] individuals to become active in commerce by 
purchasing a product, on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate commerce.” 
(emphasis added)); id.(“[P]ermitting Congress to regulate individuals precisely because they 
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III. SORNA in Court: More Questions Than Answers 
A. United States v. Kebodeaux 
The Supreme Court faced a SORNA challenge more recently in United 
States v. Kebodeaux.98 This case involved the failure of Kebodeaux, a 
former member of the Air Force convicted for having consensual sex with a 
minor, to register upon moving from San Antonio to El Paso within the 
state of Texas.99 Kebodeaux was convicted of the offense by a special 
court-marshal in 1999.100 After being convicted in the U.S. District Court 
for the Western District of Texas for failing to register, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the registration requirement was 
unconstitutional as applied to Kebodeaux.101 The question specifically 
before the Court was “whether the Constitution’s Necessary and Proper 
Clause grants Congress the power to enact SORNA’s registration 
requirements and apply them to a federal offender who had completed his 
sentence prior to the time of SORNA’s enactment.”102 The Court focused 
on the powers granted to the government under the Military Regulation 
Clause103 and the Necessary and Proper Clause.104 The Court stated,  
Here, under the authority granted to it by the Military Regulation and 
Necessary and Proper Clauses, Congress could promulgate the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice. It could specify that the sex offense of which 
Kebodeaux was convicted was a military crime under that Code. It could 
punish that crime through imprisonment and by placing conditions upon 
Kebodeaux’s release. And it could make the civil registration 
                                                                                                     
are doing nothing would open a new and potentially vast domain to congressional 
authority.”).  
 97. See generally id. 
 98. United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2496 (2013). 
 99. Id. at 2500. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. 
 102. Id.  
 103. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (stating that the Congress shall have the power to 
“make rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces”).  
 104. See id. art I, § 8, cl. 18 (stating that Congress shall have the power “[t]o make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, 
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or 
in any Department or Officer thereof”). 
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requirement at issue here a consequence of Kebodeaux’s offense and 
conviction.105 
But Chief Justice Roberts was careful to ensure that the logic 
presented in the case was applicable only to similar factual scenarios—i.e., 
military personnel—and was not connected to a federal police power.106 He 
went on to note that reading the holding this way could be easier because it 
appeared that the government had argued for some form of federal police 
power due to a heightened interest in regulating sex offenders.107 
Nevertheless, it is well established that there exists no federal police power 
because there is no such underlying grant of constitutional authority.108  
Justice Thomas reiterated this point in his dissent,109 stating that “[a]s 
applied to Kebodeaux, SORNA does not ‘carr[y] into Execution’ any of the 
federal powers enumerated in the Constitution. Rather, it usurps the general 
police power vested in the States.”110 Thomas went on to note that the law 
exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause because it 
punished even those who do not cross state lines.111 Kebodeaux is a prime 
example of someone who remained within the borders of Texas and yet was 
policed by the federal government.112 The decision in Kebodeaux leaves the 
constitutional questions of SORNA as applied to civilians ripe for judicial 
review.  
                                                                                                     
 105. United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2503 (2013). 
 106. See id. at 2507 (Roberts, J., concurring) (“I worry that incautious readers will think 
they have found in the majority opinion something they would not find in either the 
Constitution or any prior decision of ours: a federal police power.”). 
 107. See id. (“[T]he Solicitor General adopted something very close to the police power 
argument.”(quotation omitted)); id. (“[C]ontending that ‘the federal government has greater 
ties to former federal sex offenders than . . . .the general public,’ and can therefore impose 
restrictions . . . years after their unconditional release[,] . . . ‘serve[ing] . . . public-protection 
purposes.’” (quotation omitted)). 
 108. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618–19 (2000) (“[W]e always have 
rejected readings of . . . the scope of federal power that would permit Congress to exercise a 
police power.” (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584–85 
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring))). 
 109. See Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. at 2510 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Constitution 
creates a Federal Government with limited powers.”). 
 110. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 111. See id. at 2512 (“[Section 2250(a)(2)(A)] applies to all federal sex offenders who 
fail to register, even if they never cross state lines.”). 
 112. Id. at 2500 (majority opinion).  
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B. United States v. Five Gambling Devices 
In 1953, the Court grappled with an analogous question in United 
States v. Five Gambling Devices.113 The statute in question there prohibits 
the shipment of gambling devices in interstate commerce, but also includes 
registration and reporting provisions.114 Dealers were required to make 
monthly reports of sales and inventory115 to aid in the regulation of 
interstate commerce.116 But the gambling devices that the government 
seized in the case had no connection to interstate commerce and were not 
alleged by the indictment to have any connection to interstate commerce.117 
In fact,  
The indictments [did] not allege that the accused dealers, since the 
effective date of the Act or for that matter at any other time, have 
bought, sold or moved gambling devices in interstate commerce, or that 
the devices involved in their unreported sales have, since the effective 
date of the Act or at any other time, moved in interstate commerce or 
ever would do so.118 
In considering whether a law which potentially created a type of federal 
police power could be constitutional, the Court noted, “[n]o precedent of 
this Court sustains the power of Congress to enact legislation penalizing 
failure to report information concerning acts not shown to be in, or mingled 
with, or found to affect commerce.”119 The Court found the reporting 
requirements unconstitutional—although not on Commerce Clause 
grounds.120 Despite this, Kebodeaux and Five Gambling Devices share 
                                                                                                     
 113. United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 442 (1953). 
 114. See id. (“These cases present unsuccessful attempts, by two different procedures, 
to enforce the view of the Department of Justice as to construction of the Act of January 2, 
1951, which prohibits shipment of gambling machines in interstate commerce but includes 
incidental registration and reporting provisions.”). 
 115. See id. at 453 (noting that the Act required that dealers make detailed reports of 
inventory, sales, and disclosures of place of business monthly). 
 116. See id. at 442–43 (noting that the Act prohibits transportation of the devices in 
interstate commerce).  
 117. See id. at 443 
The indictments do not allege that the accused dealers, since the effective date of 
the Act or for that matter at any other time, have bought, sold or moved 
gambling devices in interstate commerce, or that the devices involved in their 
unreported sales have, since the effective date of the Act or at any other time, 
moved in interstate commerce or ever would do so. 
 118. Id. at 442.  
 119. Id. at 446. 
 120. Id. at 452. 
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factual similarities and their reasoning relates to the issues created by 
SORNA.  
C. NFIB v. Sebelius121 
The Affordable Care Act addressed the problem of individuals who are 
unable to get insurance because of preexisting conditions or other health 
issues by guaranteeing that these individuals would be able to obtain health 
insurance.122 The Act did this through the “guaranteed-issue” and 
“community-rating” provisions.123 These provisions prohibited insurance 
companies from denying health coverage or from charging exorbitant 
premiums to these individuals.124 This guarantee created a large risk for 
healthcare providers because they were required to provide insurance for 
these costly patients and these costs would far outweigh the patients’ 
premiums.125 In order to remedy this imbalance, Congress required that all 
individuals—specifically targeting young and healthy individuals who were 
likely to opt out of health insurance—purchase insurance.126 This solution 
results in cost-shifting that allows the insurance companies to afford the 
unhealthy patients by also having a large pool of healthy individuals whose 
premiums are higher than their health costs.127  
The Court in NFIB v. Sebelius addressed whether Congress can make a 
law that compels people to enter into commerce.128 Ultimately, the 
                                                                                                     
 121. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2566 (2012).  
 122. See id. at 2585 (“In the Affordable Care Act, Congress addressed the problem of 
those who cannot obtain insurance coverage because of preexisting conditions or other 
health issues.”). 
 123. See id. (describing that the ACA addressed the issue of people with preexisting 
conditions through using “guaranteed-issue” and “community-rating” provisions).  
 124. See id. (“These provisions together prohibit insurance companies from denying 
coverage to those with such conditions or charging unhealthy individuals higher premiums 
than healthy individuals.”). 
 125. See id. (describing the economic realities for insurance companies when they are 
required to provide coverage for individuals who have expensive medical conditions). 
 126. See id. (“[T]he mandate forces into the insurance risk pool more healthy 
individuals, whose premiums on average will be higher than their health care expenses. This 
allows insurers to subsidize the costs of covering the unhealthy individuals the reforms 
require them to accept.”). 
 127. Id. 
 128. See id. at 2586 (“Given its expansive scope, it is no surprise that Congress has 
employed the commerce power in a wide variety of ways to address the pressing needs of 
the time. But Congress has never attempted to rely on that power to compel individuals not 
engaged in commerce to purchase an unwanted product.”). 
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individual mandate was upheld under the Tax and Spend Clause.129 Chief 
Justice Roberts, writing for himself in Part II-A of the opinion, came to the 
conclusion that compelling people to enter into commerce is not within the 
power of the legislature.130 Justice Ginsburg vehemently disagreed with the 
Chief Justice in her dissent, insisting that the Affordable Care Act easily 
falls within the jurisdictional bounds of the Commerce Clause.131 Justice 
Scalia, with whom Justice Alito, Justice Thomas, and Justice Kennedy 
joined, also insisted that the justification for the individual mandate does 
not fall within the Commerce Clause.132 Scholars have been hesitant to give 
Sebelius meaningful precedential weight.133 But the split of votes on the 
Commerce Clause issue suggests that the new federalism era brought 
forward in the Rehnquist Court is not completely irrelevant despite the 
slight expansion in Raich.134 
                                                                                                     
 129. See id. at 2594–95 (holding that the individual mandate is legal under the Tax and 
Spend Clause by construing the language “penalty” in the statute as a tax). 
 130. See id. at 2587 
Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate individuals 
precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially vast 
domain to congressional authority. Every day individuals do not do an infinite 
number of things. In some cases they decide not to do something; in others they 
simply fail to do it. Allowing Congress to justify federal regulation by pointing 
to the effect of inaction on commerce would bring countless decisions an 
individual could potentially make within the scope of federal regulation, and—
under the Government’s theory—empower Congress to make those decisions 
for him. 
 131. See id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Congress 
chose, instead, to preserve a central role for private insurers and state governments. 
According to the Chief Justice, the Commerce Clause does not permit that preservation. This 
rigid reading of the Clause makes scant sense and is stunningly retrogressive.”). 
 132. See id. at 2642 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Failure to act does result in an effect on 
commerce, and hence might be said to come under this Court’s ‘affecting commerce’ 
criterion of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. But in none of its decisions has this Court 
extended the Clause that far.”). 
 133. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Legal Effects of NFIB v. Sebelius and the 
Constitutional Gestalt, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2013) (“NFIB is unlikely to produce stare 
decisis effects that are clear and uncontested—one way or the other.”). 
 134. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Alito, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas all 
voted that the Commerce Clause was not sufficient authority for the individual mandate. See 
generally NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
Despite these votes being in two different opinions, it suggests that if a similar Commerce 
Clause issue was presented before the Court, it is reasonable to think that the votes could 
still favor the new federalism approach to Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 
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Chief Justice Roberts recognizes that  
Given its expansive scope, it is no surprise that Congress has employed 
the commerce power in a wide variety of ways to address the pressing 
needs of the time. But Congress has never attempted to rely on that 
power to compel individuals not engaged in commerce to purchase an 
unwanted product. Legislative novelty is not necessarily fatal; there is a 
first time for everything. But sometimes “the most telling indication of 
[a] severe constitutional problem . . . is the lack of historical precedent” 
for Congress’s action.135 
The Chief Justice finds the distinction between regulating that which is 
already an aspect of commerce and compelling individuals to partake in 
commerce to be one that is of great importance.136 He stresses that the word 
“regulate” implies that there is something in existence in which to regulate, 
and that term cannot be extended to encompass the requirements of the 
individual mandate.137 The Chief Justice noted that to expand the meaning 
of the Commerce Clause power in this way would lead to a massive 
expansion of federal power.138 He writes, “Construing the Commerce 
Clause to permit Congress to regulate individuals precisely because they 
are doing nothing would open a new and potentially vast domain to 
congressional authority.”139 Justice Scalia, in his dissent, reiterates this 
concern with expanding the federal government to occupy those roles 
traditionally reserved for the states.140 He writes, “Whatever may be the 
conceptual limits upon the Commerce Clause and upon the power to tax 
and spend, they cannot be such as will enable the Federal Government to 
regulate all private conduct and to compel the States to function as 
administrators of federal programs.”141 
These Commerce Clause concerns circle back to concerns with the 
registration requirements in SORNA, where the federal government 
                                                                                                     
 135. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012).  
 136. Id. 
 137. See id. at 2587 (“The individual mandate, however, does not regulate existing 
commercial activity. It instead compels individuals to become active in commerce by 
purchasing a product, on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate commerce.”). 
 138. See id. (“Allowing Congress to justify federal regulation by pointing to the effect 
of inaction on commerce would bring countless decisions an individual could potentially 
make within the scope of federal regulation, and—under the Government’s theory—
empower Congress to make those decisions for him.”). 
 139. Id.at 2573.  
 140. See id. at 2643 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the historical context for 
limitations on federal power and reservation of certain powers for the states). 
 141. Id.  
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compels a large number of individuals to register—an activity that is 
neither “commercial” nor “interstate.”142 Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “the 
proposition that Congress may dictate the conduct of an individual today 
because of prophesied future activity finds no support in [legal] 
precedent.”143 While sometimes these offenders may move in interstate 
commerce therefore necessitating registration, interstate activity is not a 
requirement of § 16913 and registration is required regardless of interstate 
movement.144 The concerns raised by the Chief Justice and the dissenters in 
Sebelius present a new angle to attack SORNA and the requirements the 
federal government places on sex offenders. 
D. Recent Opinions Considering the Validity of SORNA Under the 
Commerce Clause 
This Section discusses the different approaches that courts have taken 
to the Commerce Clause question in SORNA. 
1. Opinions Holding Section 16913 Constitutionally Invalid 
a. United States v. Myers145 
Judge Zloch of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida found SORNA to be beyond the limits of congressional authority in 
United States v. Myers.146 Specifically, Judge Zloch held, “[Section 16913] 
is a universal regulation of certain persons without any regard for their 
place or participation in interstate commerce, and it is not part of an 
overlying economic scheme, the regulation of which Congress could 
                                                                                                     
 142. 42 U.S.C. § 16913 (2012). 
 143. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2590 (2012). 
 144. 42 U.S.C. § 16913. 
 145. United States v. Myers, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1312–50 (S.D. Fla. 2008).  
 146. See id. at 1349–50 
[T]he statutes challenged herein cannot be upheld. Section 16913 transgresses 
entirely the limits set on Congress by the Commerce Clause. It cannot be 
defended except by adulteration of the text of the Constitution and controlling 
caselaw. Section 2250 also exceeds that grant of power made to Congress under 
the Commerce Clause. It is in no way a regulation of persons in interstate 
commerce but an exertion of a general police power through an illusory and 
impermissible jurisdictional nexus. 
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reasonably anticipate would affect interstate commerce.”147 The use of the 
Commerce Clause to invoke SORNA is especially troubling because of its 
departure from the authority set forth in Gibbons v. Ogden.148 In SORNA, 
Congress did not use the Commerce Clause in a way that stays true to using 
federal authority to criminalize behavior—i.e., making it illegal to cross 
state lines for the purpose of committing a crime.149 The opinion in Myers 
recognizes this use of Commerce Clause power as legitimate because, “by 
prohibiting this use of the channels of interstate commerce . . . , ‘[Congress] 
is merely exercising the police power, for the benefit of the public, within 
the field of interstate commerce.’”150 While the court in Myers recognized 
the expansion of Commerce Clause power to regulate activities that 
substantially affect commerce, it rejects the premise that this power applies 
to SORNA legislation.151 Specifically, the legislation is not economic in 
nature, which is relevant when analyzing the statute under Raich.152 Myers 
determines that, “the stated purpose of SORNA is to establish a national sex 
offender registry to ‘protect . . . the public from sex offenders and offenders 
against children.’ This is not economic.”153 
Myers also addresses the constitutionality of § 2250, the underlying 
Section that contains a jurisdictional element.154 Section 2250 criminalizes 
the situation in which a person is required to register under SORNA, travels 
in interstate and foreign commerce, and knowingly fails to register.155 
Section 2250 differs from other federal criminal statutes in that the travel 
                                                                                                     
 147. Id. at 1316–17. 
 148. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 74 (1824)  
It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce, which is 
completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or 
between different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect 
other States. Such a power would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary. 
 149. See United States v. Myers, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1320 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (“[T]he 
person’s travel across state lines with the particular intent or object is what Congress sought 
to regulate.”). 
 150. Id. at 1320 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Brooks v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 432, 437 (1925)). 
 151. See id. at 1333 (“Here there is no congressional record to support Congress having 
a reasonable basis to conclude that the registration of or failure to register sex offenders 
would have an impact on a commercial market.”). 
 152. See id. at 1332 (quotation omitted) (finding that given the legislative goals set 
forth in SORNA it is impossible to read the legislation as regulating an economic market).  
 153. Id. (citations omitted). 
 154. See id. at 1336–49 (giving a detailed analysis of § 2250 and its constitutionality). 
 155. 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2012). 
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requirement is not linked to the criminal behavior.156 The Myers opinion 
stated, “The purpose attached to the travel is left unstated and is utterly 
divorced from the activity being regulated: knowingly failing to register as 
a sex offender.”157 The inclusion of this provision in SORNA was not 
aimed at those traveling in interstate commerce, nor was its inclusion aimed 
at those crossing state lines, rather this aspect of 2250 is indefinite and in no 
way related to the regulated activity—an individual’s failure to register.158 
b. United States v. Nasci159 
In United States v. Nasci, SORNA was found to be beyond Congress’s 
exercise of the Commerce Clause power as well as its Necessary and Proper 
power.160 Specifically, the government argued that the registration 
requirement had two purposes: First, that this registration requirement as set 
forth in the statute is simply a template for states to incorporate to receive 
federal funds, and second to impose an obligation on sex offenders that can 
be enforced through federal criminal sanctions when in federal 
jurisdiction.161 But this argument fails because the stated purpose of 
SORNA is to “establish . . . a comprehensive national system for 
registration of those offenders.”162 The limited purpose that the government 
proposed goes against the stated purpose of the statute.163 The opinion 
                                                                                                     
 156. See United States v. Myers, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1320 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (noting 
that historically Congress regulated criminal activity when the criminal crossed state lines 
with the intention of committing a crime).  
 157. Id. at 1338.  
 158. See id. (explaining that the regulation is administrative and for the purpose of 
creating a database rather than protecting and regulating interstate commerce).  
 159. United States v. Nasci, 632 F. Supp. 2d 194, 195–202 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 160. See id. at 199–201 (noting that the congressional decision to include interstate 
travel requirements precludes Necessary and Proper analysis and that, despite being broad in 
scope, the Commerce Clause does not grant the authority to regulate sex offenders). 
 161. See id. at 200  
The Government argues that § 16913 first serves as a template for registration 
requirements that states must incorporate into their own registration programs or 
otherwise receive less federal funds . . . . The second purpose of the registration 
requirements is to impose an obligation on sex offenders that may be enforced 
through federal criminal sanctions when a violation occurs under circumstances 
supporting federal jurisdiction, such as the failure to register following interstate 
travel or failure to register by a person convicted of a federal offense. 
(quotation omitted). 
 162. Id.  
 163. Id.  
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states, “Either SORNA represents Congress’s attempt to encourage states to 
adopt the registration requirements under § 16913 or the statute 
unconstitutionally creates a federal obligation for sex offenders to register 
regardless of whether they remain in-state or were convicted of purely a 
local sex offense.”164 The government also relies on the argument that the 
criminal penalty under § 2250 is constitutional when read in conjunction 
with the Necessary and Proper Clause, but, 
Congress’s decision to limit the criminal penalty statute to sex offenders 
who travel between states precludes the Government from arguing that 
§ 16913 is constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause. The 
reality of SORNA is that Congress either determined § 16913 was not 
sufficiently necessary to the interstate tracking of sex offenders so as to 
criminalize all instances of non-compliance, or alternatively, criminal 
sanctions were limited to sex offenders who travel in interstate 
commerce in an attempt to bolster the constitutionality of the statutory 
scheme and sidestep the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence established in 
Lopez. In either case, § 16913 is not a constitutional exercise of 
Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.165 
This helps explain the constitutional inconsistencies of the justifications of 
SORNA and the registration requirement.166 
The government also puts forth the argument that this legislation is a 
national solution to a problem that defies local solutions.167 This argument 
points to the difficulties in tracking sex offenders as reason to support the 
adoption of this far-reaching legislation that perhaps impinges on duties 
traditionally left to the states.168 But the court points out that these solutions 
that have been put into place—specifically United States v. Sage,169 which 
allowed for criminalization of a parent’s failure to pay child support for a 
child who resides out of state—dealt with commercial transactions that 
have a direct relationship to commerce.170 The registration requirement is 
                                                                                                     
 164. Id.  
 165. Id. at 199.  
 166. See id. (showing the inconsistencies in justifications for SORNA legislation and 
the reality of what the requirements of the legislation are). 
 167. See id. at 201 (“The Government also argues that SORNA, including the 
registration requirements established under § 16913, is a proper exercise of Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power because the statute addresses a national problem that the states are 
incapable of solving on their own.”). 
 168. See id. (pointing to this same justification used for federal regulation of child 
support payments across state lines and justifying the federal registry for the same reasons). 
 169. 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 170. See United States v. Nasci, 632 F. Supp. 2d 194, 201 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(acknowledging that the federal government has used Commerce Clause authority to 
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simply not related to commercial activity in the same way.171 The criminal 
sanctions deal directly with the failure to register or failure to update one’s 
registration and thus falls outside of the scope of the Commerce Clause 
power.172 The court held that “[t]he Commerce Clause, although broad in 
its scope, does not grant Congress unlimited authority to enact legislation 
intended to address any national issue, let alone registration requirements 
for sex offenders.”173 
2. Opinions Holding Section 16913 Constitutionally Valid  
a. United States v. Robbins174 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. 
Robbins revisits its earlier decision in United States v. Guzman175 in light of 
Commerce Clause considerations brought forward by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Sebelius.176 Notably, the Robbins decision qualifies its holding 
by raising several points regarding the opportunity to overturn the holding 
in Guzman:  
We decline Robbins’ invitation not because his arguments all lack force, 
nor because the constitutionality of SORNA—particularly when applied 
within the states—is beyond question, but because the constitutionality 
of SORNA as applied to Robbins remains unaffected by any limitations 
on Congress’s Commerce Clause power that may be found in NFIB.177 
This suggests that had the facts been different, the outcome may have been 
different.178 Robbins entertained the possibility that aspects of SORNA may 
                                                                                                     
regulate activities that defy local solution but pointing out that the activities regulated are 
inherently economic in nature). 
 171. See id. (contrasting the requirement to update a state sex-offender registry with the 
payment of child support, Consumer Credit Protection Act, Anti Car Theft Act, and other 
legislation regulating economic activity).  
 172. See id. (noting that the argument relies of the presumption that § 16913 regulates 
economic activity, but also stating that this presumption is incorrect).  
 173. Id.  
 174. 729 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2013).  
 175. 591 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2010).  
 176. See Robbins, 729 F.3d at 134 (noting that Guzman should be revisited because of 
the intervening decision in Sebelius that could cast doubt on the decision).  
 177. Id. at 132 (citation omitted). 
 178. See id. (stressing that the statute as applied to the facts is constitutional, but also 
pointing out that SORNA raises some questions as to purely local offenses enforced by 
purely local means).  
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not pass constitutional muster, but concluded that, as applied to the facts at 
hand, it was legitimate.179 Because Robbins knowingly traveled in interstate 
commerce without updating his registration, he did not fit into the category 
of individuals who do not cross state lines and therefore might fall outside 
of the scope of interstate commerce.180 The court held that in Robbins’ case, 
SORNA “not only regulate[d] activity, but activity that directly employ[ed] 
the channels of interstate commerce.”181 
While the court in Robbins considered the Commerce Clause 
arguments in Sebelius arguendo, it ultimately found that these arguments 
are either meritless or foreclosed by the Second Circuit’s previous decision 
in Guzman.182 The four arguments that the court addresses from Sebelius 
are that: (1) the Commerce Clause does not give the power to regulate 
inactivity, (2) Congress cannot regulate activity based on the future 
possibility of activity, (3) there is no federal police power, and (4) the 
Necessary and Proper Clause does not add substantive powers that are not 
enumerated in the Constitution.183 The court distinguishes the inactivity in 
Sebelius from SORNA registration requirements because sex offenders opt 
in to the system through their behavior, and in Robbins’ case his 
registration requirement was triggered by his movement through interstate 
commerce i.e. activity.184 Robbins argued that despite the interstate travel 
provision of SORNA, that is not actually what it is regulating.185 It is 
                                                                                                     
 179. See id. (declining to further explore the possibility that SORNA is unconstitutional 
because as applied to the facts in Robbins it was constitutional).  
 180. See id. (“In August 2011, after traveling from New York to Nevada, defendant-
appellant Nathan Robbins knowingly failed to update his registration as a sex offender, as he 
was required to do under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act.”). 
 181. Id. at 136. 
 182. See id. (“Assuming the accuracy of these propositions arguendo, we still find in 
them nothing that helps Robbins’ cause.”). 
 183. See id. at 135–36 
First, the Commerce Clause does not give Congress the power to regulate 
inactivity. Second, Congress cannot regulate conduct today based on activity 
predicted tomorrow. Third, the federal government does not have ‘[a]ny police 
power to regulate individuals as such, as opposed to their activities.’ Fourth, the 
Necessary and Proper Clause does not add any ‘great substantive and 
independent’ federal powers to those enumerated in the Constitution. 
(quotation omitted). 
 184. See id. at 136 (“But unlike the uninsured in NFIB, the sex offenders who are 
subjected to SORNA’s requirements have all, in a sense, ‘opted in’ to the regulated group 
through their prior criminal activity.”). 
 185. See id. (arguing that SORNA regulates offender registration rather than the travel 
and activities across state lines).  
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regulating the failure to register the three days after interstate travel.186 In 
response to this argument, the court recognizes that it may or may not have 
merit but, “it is an argument foreclosed by Guzman which held in no 
uncertain terms that § 2250(a) is a valid regulation of ‘persons traveling in 
interstate commerce.’”187  
b. United States v. Cabrera-Gutierrez188 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also decided this issue 
in 2013.189 In United States v. Cabrera-Gutierrez, the defendant relied on 
Sebelius and argued that the Commerce Clause power does not give 
Congress the power to regulate individuals because they are doing 
nothing.190 The court summarized Cabrera’s argument:  
[T]hat ‘the proposition that Congress may dictate conduct of an 
individual today [i.e., registering as a sex offender] because of 
prophesied future activity [i.e., interstate travel] finds no support in [the 
applicable Commerce Clause] precedent.’ Cabrera concludes that 
because Congress lacks the power to require an individual to register as 
a sex offender, it follows that it cannot penalize him for failing to 
register, even if he has traveled in interstate commerce.191  
The defendant also differentiated SORNA from the facts in Sebelius by 
arguing that the registration requirements were further removed from the 
purpose of the Commerce Clause power because SORNA is further 
removed from commerce.192  
The Ninth Circuit rejected these arguments, relying on the Lopez 
categories and suggesting that these broad categories encompassed the 
authority used to enact SORNA.193 The court further reasoned that the 
                                                                                                     
 186. See id. (“[Section] 2250(a), despite its interstate travel provision, does not actually 
regulate interstate travel, but rather something which occurs (or not) in the three days after 
such travel.”). 
 187. Id.  
 188. 756 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2013).  
 189. See generally id.  
 190. See id. at 1129 (asserting that the regulations set forth in SORNA are 
unconstitutional precisely because they regulate inactivity).  
 191. Id. (alterations in original).  
 192. See id. (noting that the purpose of SORNA is to protect the public from sex 
offenders through sex offender registration which is far removed from commerce). 
 193. See id. at 1138 (“We conclude, as have our sister circuits, that Congress has the 
authority under the Commerce Clause to enact SORNA and to require Cabrera to register 
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Necessary and Proper Clause gave Congress ample authority to enact 
SORNA and to punish state sex offenders who travel in interstate 
commerce.194 Furthermore, Cabrera did travel between states, and therefore, 
at least as applied to these facts, the comparison is not the same as the 
explanation for Sebelius.195 The court concluded that “Congress had the 
authority to enact SORNA and that SORNA's application to Cabrera is 
constitutional.”196 
IV. Resolving the SORNA Dilemma 
In 2003, three years before the enactment of SORNA, the Supreme 
Court heard two cases regarding the constitutionality of state registration 
and notification laws.197 The Court held that these state systems were 
indeed constitutional and ensured that these programs were a fixture in 
American exercise of state police power.198 The state laws reviewed in 
these cases, however, vary significantly from the requirements of 
SORNA.199 The punishments in these registration systems were modest 
compared to the punishment requirements in SORNA.200 The subsequent 
rubber stamping of SORNA legislation by many district courts either failed 
to take into account or superficially reviewed important federal issues that 
                                                                                                     
under SORNA as a sex offender.”). 
 194. See id. at 1131–32 
Because SORNA’s registration requirement is necessary to the effectuation of 
the broader SORNA scheme, we agree with our sister circuits in concluding that 
the Necessary and Proper Clause provided Congress ample authority to enact 
§ 16913 and to punish a state sex offender who, like Cabrera, traveled interstate, 
for failing to register. 
 195. See id. at 1132 (“Moreover, SORNA’s application to Cabrera is based on his 
further admitted activities of traveling in interstate commerce and then failing to register. 
Thus, SORNA does not punish the type of inactivity addressed in Sebelius.”). 
 196. Id.  
 197. See Corey Rayburn Yung, supra note 53, at 369–70 (discussing the history of 
Supreme Court opinions regarding sex offender registration legislation and the prior history 
to the passing of SORNA).  
 198. See id. at 370 (“The Supreme Court opinions seemingly ensured that registries 
would remain a permanent fixture of America’s sex offender policy.”). 
 199. See id. (pointing out that the state statutes at issue in the two Supreme Court cases 
involved relatively minor punishments for failure to register as compared to the possibility 
of ten years of imprisonment with SORNA).  
 200. See id. (“The two state statutes were relatively modest—with small penalties for 
failing to register—and were only reviewed in regards to limited constitutional issues.”). 
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need not be addressed in the cases involving state laws.201 The reasoning in 
Sebelius gives courts a chance to review the Commerce Clause deficiencies 
in SORNA. 
A. Fear of Sex Offenders 
SORNA and other registration and notification laws are perhaps not 
the best method of dealing with sexual offenders.202 Sex offenders are often 
characterized as strangers who abduct their victims at random.203 This 
perception is what has informed many policy decisions with regard to sex 
offenses and the public good.204 In reality, this “stranger danger” composes 
a small percentage of offenses.205 In fact,  
[s]exual violence against children as well as adults is overwhelmingly 
perpetrated by family members or acquaintances. The U.S. Bureau of 
Justice Statistics has found that just 14 percent of all sexual assault cases 
reported to law enforcement agencies involved offenders who were 
strangers to their victims. Sexual assault victims under the age of 18 at 
the time of the crime knew their abusers in nine out of 10 cases: the 
abusers were family members in 34 percent of cases, and acquaintances 
in another 59 percent of cases.206  
These statistics suggests that a sex offender registration might not be as 
preventative as law makers assume that it is. 
                                                                                                     
 201. See id. at 371 (“Beyond missing the statutory differences between SORNA and the 
state laws reviewed by the Supreme Court, lower courts have repeatedly ignored the 
language of the opinions in Smith and DPS on which those courts are ostensibly relying. 
Further, whereas the laws reviewed by the Court did not enable viable challenges based 
upon the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, the Ex Post Facto Clause, or the Commerce 
Clause, SORNA has run roughshod over the rights derived from those constitutional 
provisions.”). 
 202. See id. at 423 (suggesting that the public perception of who commits sex offenses 
is at odds with the statistical data).  
 203. See id. at 423–24 (discussing the misconception that sex offenses are committed 
by strangers lying in wait to kidnap and rape women and children).  
 204. See id. at 423 n.300 (“The myth of the stranger as the typical sex offender 
continues to mislead policymakers in designing effective laws to combat sexual violence.”). 
 205. See id. at 423–24 (“However, “sex offenders” are not universally the archetypal 
characters lying in wait to kidnap and rape children; many have committed relatively petty 
offenses, such as the youthful indiscretion of public exposure, or an act of engaging in 
prostitution.”). 
 206. See id. (quoting Human Rights Watch, No Easy Answers: Sex Offender Laws in 
the US 35 n.91 (2007)). 
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What is also not taken into account is that the definition of a sex 
offense is broad and can include relatively minor offenses such as indecent 
exposure.207 In many states offenses such as public urination, consensual 
sexual intercourse between minors, and prostitution between consenting 
adults constitute sex offenses.208 The inclusion of these offenses in a 
national registry with incredibly harsh punishment for failure to register 
seems counter-productive to the goals of SORNA, and simply creates more 
individuals for the federal government to keep track of, rather than focusing 
their resources on sex offenders who are particularly dangerous. 
B. Fixing Statutory Deficiencies of SORNA 
As written, SORNA still contains questions as to its constitutionality 
in light of Lopez, Morrison, Raich, and Sebelius.209 The questions raised 
under Lopez and Morrison could be fixed through simple statutory 
changes.210 Congress could amend § 2250(a)(2)(B) to look more like 
criminal statutes that came under the purview of the Commerce Clause in 
the past.211 This would entail making the failure to register connected in 
some way to interstate travel or perhaps look more like the Mann Act, 
where interstate travel in order to commit the crime is a required element.212 
                                                                                                     
 207. See id. at 424 n.301 (“In many states, people who urinate in public, teenagers who 
have consensual sex with each other, adults who sell sex to other adults, and kids who 
expose themselves as a prank are required to register as sex offenders.” (quoting HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE US 5 (2007), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0907webwcover.pdf)). 
 208. Id.  
 209. See id. at 418 (“Nonetheless, under the best readings of Lopez and SORNA, courts 
should reject government justifications for § 2250(a) under the third Lopez category.”). 
 210. See id. at 419 (“It cannot be the case that Congress need merely repeat the magic 
words ‘interstate commerce,’ and an act will be found constitutional. The jurisdictional 
limitation must match the confines that the Court has laid out as the proper scope of the 
Commerce Clause.”). 
 211. See id. at 423 
Congress could amend § 2250(a)(2)(B) to more closely follow the language the 
Court has utilized in Lopez and Morrison or use the model of the Mann Act so 
the travel is explicitly linked with the failure of register. Thus, Congress could 
mandate that a person be subject to the provisions of SORNA only insofar as 
travel between state lines has resulted in a failure to register. Short of 
congressional action to correct the deficiencies of SORNA, however, § 2250(a) 
should be struck down by federal courts. 
 212. See id. (suggesting that the language in SORNA look more like the language of the 
Mann Act, where the travel across state lines is explicitly related to the crime). 
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This solution is more complicated after the Court’s decision in Sebelius, but 
these changes are a step in the right direction to amending this statute that 
greatly expands federal power into the realm of traditional state 
authority.213 
C. Supreme Court Action 
The holding in Kebodeaux failed to answer the question of SORNA’s 
constitutionality outside of the realm of military justice, and opened the 
door for a case with similar facts to appeal all the way to the Supreme 
Court.214 Since the narrowing of Commerce Clause jurisprudence in the 
1990s, the Court reads statutes narrowly in order to preserve their 
constitutionality, or will find statutes constitutional as applied to the facts 
before the court but leave open the question as to constitutionality of 
different facts.215 Federal courts have acknowledged that the 
constitutionality of SORNA is in question, but ultimately decided that as 
applied to the facts before them the statute stands.216 This approach does a 
disservice to the people who are unfairly bound by the requirements of 
SORNA.217 Even if the Court only makes a limited finding with regard to 
SORNA, it could be helpful in bringing some of the issues with the Act to 
the public eye.218 It is important to remember that, “[w]hile the cause of 
stopping sexual violence is a good one, it is a mistake to make 
constitutional exceptions to target the population of convicted sex 
offenders.”219 
                                                                                                     
 213. See id. at 422 (“While it is too easy to add to such overly-pessimistic rhetoric, the 
provisions of SORNA really do represent an unprecedented expansion of federal power.”). 
 214. See United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2503 (2013) (“Here, under the 
authority granted to it by the Military Regulation and Necessary and Proper Clauses, 
Congress could promulgate the Uniform Code of Military Justice.”). 
 215. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 269–71 (pointing out cases where the Supreme 
Court has read statutes narrowly so as to avoid the question of constitutionality). 
 216. See generally United States v. Robbins, 729 F.3d 131 (2d Cir 2013) (holding that 
SORNA is valid as applied); United States v. Cabrera-Gutierrez, 756 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 
2013) (holding that SORNA is a valid use of Commerce Clause authority as applied). 
 217. See Yung, supra note 197, at 424 (“Many offenders subject to SORNA’s 
requirements have not been arrested for crimes in decades. These persons are already subject 
to a bevy of limitations on their liberties. The heavy penalties and restrictions of SORNA 
have added to that already substantial mix.”). 
 218. See id. (noting that although this issue might have difficulty gaining public 
traction, the rights at stake are fundamental and need to be addressed by district courts).  
 219. Id.  
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V. Conclusion 
The registration requirements as set forth in SORNA are the creation 
of a federal police power beyond the powers set forth in the Constitution.220 
This legislation takes behavior normally regulated by the states and creates 
a federal obligation to register for an offense for which time has already 
been served.221 Despite claims that this registration requirement is not 
punishment beyond the sentence, there are real consequences for those who 
continually have to register for those crimes in their past—such as inability 
to find work and housing.222 On top of these difficulties, failure to re-
register within three days of changing jobs or residence could result in a 
federal felony and ten years in prison.223 This stigma and punishment is 
extended to a large group of individuals—many of whom committed minor 
offenses many years ago.224 This is the very sort of unjust punishment that 
our Constitution strives to protect against.  
                                                                                                     
 220. Supra Part I.D. 
 221. Supra Part I.C. 
 222. Supra Part I.C. 
 223. 42 U.S.C. § 16913 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2012). 
 224. See Yung, supra note 197, at 424 (noting that many offenders who are required to 
register under SORNA have not been arrested in decades).  
